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The social welfare function and individual responsibility: 
Some theoretical issues and empirical evidence from health 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The literature on income distribution has attempted to quantitatively analyse different 
degrees of inequality using a social welfare function (SWF) approach.  However, it has 
largely ignored the source of such inequalities, and has thus failed to consider different 
degrees of inequity.  The literature on egalitarianism has addressed issues of equity, 
largely in relation to individual responsibility.  This paper brings these two literatures 
together by introducing the concept of individual responsibility into the SWF approach.  
The results from an empirical study of people’s preferences in relation to the 
distribution of health benefits are presented to illustrate how the parameter values in 
such a SWF might be determined. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
How to allocate resources in the public sector so as to achieve a fair and efficient 
distribution of benefits has been a major concern for economists.  A social welfare 
function (SWF), which seeks to show the trade-off between the maximisation of 
benefits and an equitable distribution of those benefits, is often used to analyse 
distributional issues.  There are a number of ways in which the SWF can be specified 
and there has been much theoretical work in this area.  There have been some, though 
far fewer, attempts to estimate SWFs from the stated preferences of individuals.  In an 
extensive programme of research over many years, Amiel and Cowell have, in various 
ways, asked respondents to choose between different distributions of income in order to 
explore the extent to which axioms used in the income distribution literature are 
supported by the lay public (Amiel, Cowell 1999).  The results from these studies can 
be used to determine the SWF for income.   
 
These studies have focused on the extent to which people are willing to trade-off overall 
benefits for a more equal distribution of benefits i.e. equality-efficiency trade-offs.  But 
is an unequal distribution necessarily an inequitable one?  Might some inequalities (in 
income, health or whatever) be considered fair?  To answer these questions – about 
equity-efficiency trade-offs – we would need to know something about the reasons for 
the inequalities.  If, for example, they were caused by factors outside people’s control, 
then we might be willing to pay a higher price (in terms of overall benefits foregone) in 
order to reduce them.  If, however, the inequalities were the result of people’s 
autonomous choices, then we might see them as the acceptable consequences of 
expressions of free will (Miller 1992). 
 
There has been much debate in the ethical literature on egalitarianism about the role that 
individual responsibility should play in judging the fairness of various inequalities in 
society.  The central question for any egalitarian theory is “equality of what?”.  This 
question involves identifying those things that ought – and ought not – to be equal 
across individuals.  Dworkin (1981) draws a distinction – referred to as Dworkin’s cut – 
between an individual’s “preferences” and his “resources”, holding him responsible for 
inequalities that result from differences in the former but not the latter.  Cohen (1989) 
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redefines this distinction to be one between “choice” and “luck” (also see Rawls, 1971, 
Arneson, 1990, Roemer, 1993).  Fleurbaey (1995a, 1995b) distinguishes further 
between kinds of responsibility (by individual “control” or by social “delegation”) and 
the object of responsibility (over “factors” or over “outcomes”), and argues for the 
equality of delegated outcomes.  Whatever the details of the different approaches, the 
key egalitarian concept is that inequalities for which individuals can be held responsible 
are not unjust – an inequality only becomes an inequity if an individual cannot be held 
responsible for his disadvantage. 
 
So, if we are to say something meaningful about equity-efficiency trade-offs, and hence 
to express this in a SWF, we need to go beyond consequences and consider the causes 
of, and whether individuals can be held responsible for, any inequalities in addition to 
their extent.  This paper addresses some of the theoretical and empirical issues 
associated with estimating the parameters of a specified SWF, with particular reference 
to health benefits.  Section 1 sets out the functional form of the SWF used in this study, 
and then considers health as the argument in the SWF.  Section 3 discusses the 
relevance of different causes of health inequality, and Section 4 illustrates how, based 
on empirical data, the parameters of the SWF can be determined.  Section 5 presents the 
results from an empirical study that elicited the general public’s preferences over the 
equity-efficiency trade-off in health, and these data are used to determine the parameters 
of the SWF.  Section 6 discusses the implications of the results for estimating the 
parameters of SWFs across different contexts. 
 
I. THE SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTION 
 
There are a number of functional forms that the SWF can take.  In order to deal with 
varying degrees of inequality, an additive SWF with convexity to the origin to allow for 
inequality aversion has been widely used in the literature (see Layard, Walters, 1994; 
Ray, 1984; Little, Mirrlees, 1974; Wagstaff, 1994).  This kind of generalised 
Benthamite SWF can be traced back to Atkinson (1970).  Here, a SWF with a constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) for the two-party case is assumed, so that: 
 
[ ] ,)1( 1rrBrA UUW −−− −+= αα       ,0, ≥BA UU   10 ≤≤ α ,  ,1−≥r   ,0≠r                 [1]  
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where W is the level of social welfare and UA and UB are the total level of individual 
well-being (u) of groups A and B so that U = Σ u.  What U and u actually represent can 
be kept fairly open so long as: a) it is a measure of well-being which is capable of being 
expressed on a cardinal scale; b) the individual well-being functions are identical across 
individuals; and c) the level of u associated with death is zero.  The groups A and B are 
of equal size, homogeneous, and identical in terms of their non-responsibility attributes. 
 
 
As is well established, parameter r of equation [1] represents the degree of inequality 
aversion, ranging from the inequality neutral utilitarian-type SWF at r = -1, to the 
maximin Rawlsian-type SWF as r approaches infinity.  The parameter . reflects the 
weight given to one group relative to the other, and is reflected by he steepness of the 
iso-welfare contours about the 45º ray.  If both groups are weighted equally in the social 
welfare calculus, then . = (1 - .) = 0.5, thus resulting in contours that are symmetric 
around the 45o ray, with a gradient of -1.  When . - .), the contour will be 
asymmetric, and the gradient at the intersection with the 45o ray will be less steep when 
α < (1 - α), and more steep when α > (1 - α).  
 
Whilst the asymmetric case of .≠ (1 - .) is presented as the “generalised” form of the 
Benthamite SWF, the literature typically assumes symmetry and thus .= (1 - .).  In 
relation to income distribution, for example, the argument is that the social welfare 
calculus should ignore information about individuals other than their income levels (see 
Musgrave, 1959; Boadway, Bruce, 1984; Harsanyi, 1992).  This anonymity requirement 
implies that all parties are equally deserving of any given gain in well-being, but this 
should only be restricted to attributes beyond an individual’s responsibility.  If, for 
example, the extent to which individuals have control over their well-being is relevant, 
then the SWF needs to reflect this. 
 
The above discussion has referred to well-being but has used the notation U to represent it.  
This is no coincidence since most SWFs rely on an individual’s subjective assessment of 
her own utility.  Whilst there has been increasing interest in the source of an individual’s 
utility – for example, correcting it for mistaken beliefs (Broome 1991) or excluding 
certain ‘antisocial’ preferences, such as envy and malice (Harsanyi 1982) – all standard 
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economic models are concerned with the distribution of individual utility.  As a result, the 
reasons why one individual may obtain more utility than another from the consumption 
of a good is not an issue: one may have different needs or one may simply be a more 
effective ‘pleasure generating machine’ i.e. he may be easier to please.   
 
However, ignoring the source of differences in individual utility may also have 
damaging limitations in the context of interpersonal comparisons of well-being (Sen 
1987).  The utility that an individual gets from a given input is to some extent 
determined by her past investment (a poorly educated person may be less productive in 
generating utility from unit consumption) and by her expectations (a socially 
disadvantaged person may adapt not to expect much).  And because of this, a deprived 
poor person might generate less utility from a given health improvement, say, than a 
richer person.  If health care were to be distributed so as to maximise utility, then in 
such circumstances the rich person would be given priority.  This is a solution that 
would contradict many people’s conception of fairness. 
 
This has led to alternative conceptions of welfare that, in various ways, use ‘objective’ 
criteria to define well-being.  For example, Sen (1987) has argued that attention should be 
focused on an individual’s basic capabilities, which looks at what certain goods (such as 
health care) can do for her, rather than at the utility she derives from them.  Sen’s work 
has been influential in the debate about why health care is considered to be more 
important than many other commodities.  For example, Culyer (1989) has argued that 
health care, through its impact on health, enables an individual to ‘flourish’.  So people 
need health care that improves their health.  Thus, in the case of distributing health care, 
what matters is not an individual’s subjective assessment of her own utility from health 
care but rather an ‘objective’ assessment of the improved health that health care may 
produce.  When the objective is to distribute health (rather than utility), the SWF 
approach is potentially useful in a policy context since health is more readily 
interpersonally comparable than utility is (see Olsen 1997; Dolan 1998).   
 
II. THE CAUSES OF HEALTH INEQUALITIES 
 
Some inequalities in health might be considered less inequitable than others if they are 
attributed to individual responsibility.  For example, Le Grand (1991) has argued that 
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entitlements to public services depend in part on the goodness of social actions, and so a 
citizen who has been destructive to her health might deserve less entitlement to such 
services.  And Roemer (1993) suggests that different choices in relation to lifestyle etc. 
are legitimate grounds for different entitlements – provided that proper allowance has 
been made for the fact that some ‘types’ of people are better able to make informed 
choices than others.  There is obviously much controversy around the issues e.g. insofar 
as the degree of control that people have over their own actions is concerned, and the 
extent to which there exists a relationship between a particular action and subsequent ill 
health.  We make no substantive claims about these issues here.  For our purposes, we 
need only to assume that all conditions can be located along an analytical spectrum from 
being exogenously determined (e.g. due to ‘bad luck’) through to being endogenously 
determined (e.g. as a result of well-informed ‘own choices’).  
 
So far as the exogenous causes of ill health are concerned, some people might simply 
have been unlucky in the biological lottery to be born with an inherited disease, whilst 
others may have been the innocent victims of an identified cause of their ill health e.g. 
being hit by a car on the pavement.  In such circumstances, where an individual 
experiences ill health through no fault of her own, it would seem that she has a 
relatively large claim to improved health through publicly funded health care.  With 
endogenous causes, ill health would rarely be entirely attributable to a person’s own 
actions – for example, with smoking-related conditions there is much unexplained 
variation in who contracts those conditions.  Nevertheless, most people would consider 
ill health as a result of smoking to be located closer towards the endogenous end of the 
spectrum than ill health through genetic inheritance, and that is all that is required here 
for smokers to be afforded a relatively smaller claim to improved health from health 
care than those with inherited diseases. 
 
There is now empirical evidence that many people wish to give less priority to those 
who are considered to be in some way responsible for their ill health.  For example, a 
large-scale general population survey found that about 50% of the UK general public 
support discrimination against smokers (Jowell et al 1996).  Further, in a study that 
explicitly explored the location of Dworkin’s cut, Schokkaeart and Devooght (1999) 
found that the modal preference was not to compensate smokers with lung cancer who 
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incurred extra treatment costs – in contrast with the case of genetic disorders, where the 
overwhelming majority supported full or partial compensation of the extra cost. 
  
If people with the same level of health are seen to have different claims depending on 
where they fall on the endogenous/exogenous spectrum, then it should also be the case 
that those granted smaller (larger) claims would continue to do so even when their 
health is worse (better).  Based purely on concerns for equality, those in worse health 
(such as smokers) have the potential to be given a larger weight due to the parameter r 
in equation [1].  But if .< 0.5 (because smoking is to some extent a matter of individual 
responsibility), then this will work to partially or even fully cancel out the effect of 
inequality aversion.  An interesting issue, then, is whether or not individual 
responsibility associated with smoking is strong enough to overturn the concern for the 
smokers’ poorer health.  To answer this question, we need empirical data to determine 
the parameter values of both r and .in the SWF. 
 
III. USING EMPIRICAL DATA TO DETERMINE THE SWF 
 
In order to calculate the values of r and α, we need to identify two points on the same 
contour that are judged to be equally good in terms of social welfare.  Note that this 
requires respondents to identify points that they consider to be equally good for society, 
rather than points they consider to be equally good for them personally.  As such, the 
exercise taps into the respondents’ preferences as citizens, rather than as consumers (see 
Dolan et al 2003). 
 
We can calculate the value of r if we know two points on the same contour, and the 
value of ..  An empirical study should identify two points, X and Y, that are equally 
good in terms of social welfare, lying on the same side of the 45º ray.  Then, the 
marginal rate of substation (MRS) at the midpoint of X and Y along the contour can be 
expressed as: 
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Further, by definition,  
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applies as an approximation at the same point.  By taking the logarithms of these, and 
solving for r,  
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Thus, the value of r is approximated as a function of ., and it is straightforward to show 
that there is only one value of r for each value of .. 
 
Along the 45° diagonal, where UA = UB, the MRS is independent of r and is entirely a 
function of α, and this fact can be used to calculate the value of α.  Starting from an 
initial point, where UA = UB, an empirical study could seek to identify another set of 
states, X and Y, with the same level of social welfare.  Suppose for simplicity that there 
are only two levels of individual well-being, survival and death.  Under state X, 
individuals in group A are split into two sub-groups: p will survive and N - p will die, 
while all N individuals in group B will die (p < N).  Under state Y, the opposite applies, 
so that all N individuals in group A will die, while q individuals in group B will survive 
and N - q will die (q < N).  If p and q are sufficiently small, then the gradient of the 
tangent at the initial point can be approximated by a ratio of these two, as 
p
q
dU
dU
BA UUB
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−≈
−
−=−
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α
1
 
so that 
qp
q
+
≈α .                                                                                        [3] 
 
Therefore, values for r and . can be calculated by designing appropriate empirical 
studies that identify the relevant points on the UA – UB plane.  Moreover, since the 
MRSAB along the contour represents the importance of the well-being of group A 
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relative to the well-being of group B, it will also represent the relative weights at the 
margin given to the well-being of the two groups.  This ‘equity weight’ is thus 
calculated as: 
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IV. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
Letters inviting potential respondents to attend a one-to-one interview were sent out to 
1,500 individuals randomly drawn from the electoral register in three wards in York.  
From the 467 who agreed to take part, 140 were selected for interview based on the 
background characteristics they supplied in a reply slip.  Of these, 130 turned up for 
interview.  The achieved sample was broadly representative of the population of 
Yorkshire and Humberside in terms of sex, age, employment status, number of years of 
schooling and the percentage of smokers.  All interviews were carried out at the 
University of York by three trained interviewers.  Each interview consisted of a series 
of questions, which in total took about an hour to complete.   
 
There were a number of versions of the questionnaire that were administered over two 
rounds of interviewing (full details of the study design can be found in Shaw et al 
2001).  However, the general structure of the interview was that each respondent was 
asked questions relating to: 1) inequalities in life expectancy at birth by social class or 
by sex; 2) inequalities in rates of long-term illness by social class or by smoking status; 
3) inequalities in rates of childhood mortality by social class; and 4) the treatment of 
two groups of people, one that has taken care of their health and one that has not.  The 
second question concerning smoking status, and the fourth question are relevant to this 
study.  Given different versions of the questionnaire, 31 respondents answered the 
second question in relation to smoking status and 56 answered the fourth question. 
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Responses to the fourth question can be used to calculate ..  Respondents are told that 
there are two groups of people in equal health.  The groups are the same in all relevant 
respects except that those in the first group (A) have not cared for their health whilst 
those in the second group (B) have taken care of their health.  Without an intervention, 
all individuals are expected to die soon, but there are not enough resources to save all.  
Respondents are asked to choose between two programmes: Programme 1 will save 100 
lives from group A and Programme 2 will save q lives from group B.  Both programmes 
cost the same and all saved individuals will have equal health gains.  To identify the 
relative importance of these two programmes, respondents are offered a series of pair-
wise choices between p = 100 and decreasing values of q.  This is illustrated in Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
The values of q used are: 100, 95, 75, 50, 25 and 5, and a respondent is assumed to be 
indifferent between the two programmes at the midpoint of the last pair where 
programme 1 was chosen and the first pair where programme 2 was chosen.  Values for 
. and the resulting implied weights are presented in columns 3 and 4 in Table 1.  The 
table shows that the median respondent is indifferent between saving the lives of 100 
people from group A and saving the lives of 45 people from group B.  Thus, using 
equation [3], the value of . is 0.31.  The implication of applying this to equation [4] is 
that, in the absence of health inequalities, the weight given to a marginal health 
improvement for someone who has not cared for her health is about half (0.45) as much 
as that for someone who has cared for their health.  
 
This value of .can then be applied to the responses to the question where an inequality 
in health exists between smokers and non-smokers, which the smokers are to some 
extent responsible for.  This is question two, where respondents are first presented with 
information on the existing inequality in the prevalence rates of long-term illness 
amongst smokers and non-smokers.  They are then asked to choose between Programme 
1 that will reduce the prevalence of long-term illness by equal amounts for the two 
groups, and Programme 2 that is targeted at smokers.  If a respondent chooses 
Programme 1, she is asked no further questions.  If a respondent chooses Programme 2, 
then this means that reducing inequalities matters despite the worse off group having 
some responsibility over their disadvantageous situation, and so the next set of 
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questions explores the extent to which this is so by making Programme 2 less effective 
until the respondent switches from programme 1 to programme 2.  As before, it is 
assumed that the respondent is indifferent between the two programmes at the midpoint 
of the options immediately before and after switching.  Thus, the exercise will lead to 
identifying two points on the same iso-welfare curve.  This is illustrated in Figure 2, 
under the α = 0.5 assumption.  When α < 0.5, the contour will pass through the same 
two points, but the gradient at the 45° ray will be less steep. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
 
The value of r can be calculated from equation [2], for different values of α.  Table 2 
presents values of r for three values of ., from the case where . = 0.5 (i.e. both smokers 
and non-smokers are given the same weight) to the case where .= 0.3 (as identified 
from the responses to the fourth question).  The implied equity weights for a marginal 
health improvement at the initial point (derived from equation [4]) are given for each 
value of..  When there is no concern for how health is distributed and no concern for 
the extent to which individuals are responsible for their health (i.e. r = -1, . = 0.5), the 
relative weight given to smokers (and non-smokers) is one.  When there is some 
concern for equality but more concern for responsibility, the weights are smaller than 
one, but as the concern for inequality in health grows (i.e. in the lower rows), this will 
begin to outweigh the responsibility factor so that the weight will eventually be larger 
than one.  From responses to this study, the relative weight given to a marginal health 
improvement to a smoker in poorer health relative to a non-smoker in better health 
could be as low as 0.43 (on the assumption that the poorer health of smokers is entirely 
their responsibility). 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
 
The SWF represents two things – the trade-off between equality and efficiency and the 
relative weight given to different individuals or groups.  Some empirical studies have 
attempted to measure people’s preferences regarding the former, assuming that .= 0.5.  
However, there are good reasons – and some related empirical evidence – for supposing 
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that some inequalities (in health or whatever) are less inequitable than others; in 
particular, that those resulting from individual choices are less unfair.  Moreover, two 
people with very different preferences – one who cares a lot about inequalities but who 
wishes to blame the worse off for those inequalities and one who cares less about 
inequalities but who also blames the worse off less – might give precisely the same 
answer to many of the questions that have been asked in empirical studies to date that 
have not distinguished between equality and equity. 
 
In the study reported in this paper, we have tried to estimate not only the value of r, but 
also the value of . in the health-related SWF.  The responses suggest that people who 
have not cared for their own health are given about half as much weight as those who 
have cared for their health.  And, on average, respondents were unwilling to reduce 
inequalities in health that were due to smoking behaviour.  Of course, it is very difficult 
to calculate precise values for . independently of r – they may be formally separable 
from one another but are inextricably related in any empirical investigation.  And it is 
difficult to discern respondents’ beliefs about a) how much control individuals have 
over their actions, such as their smoking behaviour, and b) the causal relationship 
between those actions and resulting inequalities, such as in rates of long-term illness.  
The results presented here should be seen to represent a lower limit on the weight given 
to smokers vis-à-vis non-smokers, rather than as a precise weight. 
 
There are at least two more general reasons for treating the results with caution.  First, it 
is well recognised that people’s preferences are to some extent constructed during the 
process by which they are elicited (see Rabin 1998 for an excellent review).  Whilst 
many of the well-known framing effects were controlled for, it is impossible to remove 
all possible sources of bias.  For example, it is now well established that respondents 
may give greater weight to the losses of one group as compared to an equivalent gain to 
the other group (Schweitzer 1995).  Therefore, the questions were designed so that 
neither programme in the smoking question involved any losses, and so that neither 
programme was presented as representing the status quo.  However, loss aversion may 
also be present when considering potential as well as actual losses from a particular 
reference point (Dolan and Robinson 2001) and, if some respondents to the second 
question adopted the potential gains available to both groups in programme 1 as their 
reference point, then programme 2 would involve a ‘loss’ to the non-smokers. 
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Second, there are questions relating to the reliability of stated preference data, 
particularly of the kind gathered in this study, which asked respondents to consider their 
preferences over benefits to other people.  As with other studies that have sought to 
elicit citizen-type preferences over different public policies, it is not possible to test our 
results against the preferences that respondents reveal in their private consumer-type 
behaviour.  In addition, we cannot rule out the possibility that some respondents may 
have given what Miller (1992) refers to as ‘Sunday Best’ responses; that is, “the views 
that people think they ought to hold according to some imbibed theory as opposed to the 
operational beliefs that would guide them in a practical situation.”  However, most 
respondents were willing to discriminate against those who have not cared for their 
health, so evidence of this would appear to be weak. 
 
In general terms, this study has shown that, when considering inequalities in health, 
people seem to give a great deal of weight to the extent to which individuals can be held 
responsible for those inequalities.  It is unclear whether the same results would be found 
in other contexts.  The study by Schokkaert and Devooght (1999) referred to above used 
examples of public financing of health care and also of the redistribution of labour 
income.  They found that these two contexts invoke significantly different patterns of 
responses regarding which inequalities should be compensated for, and how.  
Unfortunately, the question on health care financing was related to additional 
expenditure whilst the question on income concerned redistribution within the two 
groups, and so the results are not strictly comparable across these two contexts.  
However, their results, like ours reported here, suggest that the parameter . is as 
important in the construction of a SWF as the parameter r, and future empirical studies 
that seek to estimate the SWF across a range of different contexts should take due 
account of this. 
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 Figure 1: Eliciting the value of α    
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UA: well-being, or health, of the group that has not taken care of themselves 
UB: well-being, or health of the group that has taken care of themselves 
I: initial point 
X: outcome offered by programme 1: save p = 100 individuals from group A 
options: the set of options offered by programme 2: save q individuals from group B 
Y: the point at which a given respondent is indifferent between the two programmes 
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UA: health of the less advantaged group 
UB: health of the more advantaged group 
I: initial point 
It is assumed that .= 0.5 
 
X: outcome offered by programme 1 
the horizontal broken line: the set of options (1 to n) offered by programme 2 
Y: the point at which the median respondent is indifferent between the two programmes, 
and thus the point through which the iso-welfare curve crosses the broken line 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Eliciting the value of r 
UB 
 X UA = UB 
   
 
n . … Y …1 
 I 
iso -welfare 
0 UA 
21 
 
Table 1:  Person trade-off question 
 
  
 
No. of people 
who have not 
cared for the 
health (p) 
No. of people 
who have 
cared for their 
health (q) 
Distribution of 
responses 
n = 56 
Implied . 
Implied weight 
for those who 
have not taken 
care of their 
health, at initial 
point 
100 100 or more 1 0.5 1.00 
100 97.5 4 0.49 0.98 
100 77.5 21 0.44 0.78 
100 45.0 24 0.31 0.45 
100 17.5 1 0.15 0.18 
100 5 or less 5 0.05 0.05 
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Table 2:  Question on limiting long-term illness in smokers and non-smokers 
 
percentage 
without 
limiting long 
term illness: 
95% and 67% 
is equivalent 
to 90% and … 
Distribution 
of responses 
n = 31 
. = 0.5, - ./ (1-.) = 1.00 . = 0.4, - ./ (1-.)   = 0.67 . = 0.3, - ./ (1-.) = 0.43 
  Implied r Implied weight Implied r Implied weight Implied r Implied weight 
72% (or more) 27 -1.00 1.00 0.42 0.67 1.96 0.43 
        
71.75% 0 -0.82 1.07 0.59 0.71 2.12 0.46 
71.25% 0 -0.44 1.24 0.95 0.83 2.47 0.53 
70.5% 0 0.20 1.58 1.57 1.06 3.06 0.68 
69.5% 2 1.28 2.39 2.61 1.60 4.07 1.03 
68.5% 1 2.87 4.40 4.17 2.93 5.59 1.88 
67.5% 0 6.22 15.90 7.49 10.60 8.88 6.81 
        
67% or less 1 Infinity Infinity Infinity Infinity Infinity Infinity 
 
